

To What Degree Does China's Growing Influence Challenge American Global Supremacy?

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the Sino-American rivalry within the framework of Organski's Power Transition Theory and tries to ascertain the degree of threat that China's rise poses to the global supremacy of the US. While a basic economic analysis based on Purchasing Power parity suggests a transition already in progress, this study disproves any actual transition on the global scale. Through a careful analysis of recent empirical data from 2024-25, pertaining to global currency reserves, capability of projecting military power and alliance networks, this paper reveals that despite of material parity, China doesn't have the structural power to displace the US as global Hegemon. Although China shows a high level dissatisfaction and revisionist ambitions through Global Governance Initiative and expansion of BRICS membership and functions, the structural supremacy of the US in the global hierarchy remains intact. This paper concludes that China may be on its way to become a regional hegemon, but cannot attain global dominance, leading to a condition of 'entrenched asymmetry' instead of a complete power transition.

Key terms: Material Power, Structural Power, Power Transition Theory (PTT), Thucydides trap, Hegemony, Rising Power, Entrenched Asymmetry

I. INTRODUCTION

With the commissioning of Fujian (Type 003) into active service on 5th of November, 2025, by the People's Liberation Army (PLA), China had its third and most advanced aircraft carrier in its naval services. It has electromagnetic catapults (EMALS) and ability to launch J-35 fighter planes- China's 5th generation stealth fighters, marking a new height of Chinese military industrialization (Naval News, 2025). On November 5, 2025, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) officially commissioned the *Fujian* (Type 003), its third and most advanced aircraft carrier, into active service.

From a military perspective it would mark a critical phase of 'Thucydides Trap'- an inevitable conflict between the ruling and the rising powers. However, just a week before the active commissioning of Fujian, the October 2025 World Economic Outlook released by the International Monetary Fund presented an interesting contradiction. While China maintained its dominance in manufacturing, the global dominance of the US Dollar remained intact at 59% of the foreign exchange with China's Renminbi stagnant at below 3% (IMF, 2025).

These two contradictory data points present a key puzzle of our century- while China has superpower level artifacts like ships, weapons and production capabilities, it still misses a hegemonic architecture in terms of alliances, reserve currency and soft power. It leads to the central question of this paper: *To what degree does China's growing influence challenge American global supremacy?*

This paper takes the position that the dynamics of Sino American relationship does not indicate a typical power transition as A.F.K. Organski defines it. Instead, it appears to be a 'structural stalemate'. In his Power Transition Theory Organski argues inevitability of war between a dissatisfied challenger and the dominant power when the former achieves parity with the later. While China fulfils the criteria of revisionist dissatisfaction, it hasn't yet achieved the structural parity. Although China remains the global powerhouse of manufacturing, its challenge to the US dominance is resisted by three structural elements- the US Dollar still dominates the global reserves, it doesn't have military alliances at the scale of NATO or AUKUS, and its attempt at building alternative institutions like BRICS bank fail to substitute the Bretton Woods institutions. Hence, China's role as a dissatisfied challenger has a high degree of intensity, but limited scope. It poses threats to the US influence in the Indo-Pacific region, but does not present a credible threat to the global supremacy of the USA.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

An assessment of the level of Chinese challenge requires an understanding of mechanics involved in the decline of a hegemon. Power Transition Theory, which counters the 'Balance of Power' realism offered by Kenneth Waltz and many other scholars, provides the theoretical framework for this paper.

A. The Hierarchy of Power

Power Transition Theory looks at the global system as a hierarchy instead of an anarchic equality of sovereign states. At the top of this hierarchy is the dominant power, in this case the USA, that shapes the world order to fit its interests. Next come the great powers like China, the European Union and Russia, Middle Powers and Small Powers. Organski argues that maintaining peace is not achievable through a balance of power but rather a 'preponderance of power' invested with a hegemon that is satisfied with its position. The stability of this system is predicated upon a large gap that separates the dominant power from the challenger. Rapid industrialization and growth of a Great Power can narrow the gap between the capabilities of the dominant power and the challenger, causing instability (Organski, 1958).

B. The Conditions for Conflict: Parity and Dissatisfaction

Within the theoretical framework of Power Transition Theory, Organski and other scholars predicate a 'power transition war' over the fulfilment of two necessary pre-conditions-

- a) Parity: when the challenger achieves around 80 to 120% of capabilities possessed by the dominant power, it creates a 'danger zone' where belief in chances of victory drives the challenger and fear of being overtaken drives the dominant hegemon.
- b) Dissatisfaction: Parity between the dominant power and the challenger is not enough to start a power transition war. If a rising power feels satisfied with the status quo (like the USA overtaking the UK in the later part of 19th century) or the dominant hegemon accepts the change, there is no threat of war. The inevitability of a power transition war is predicated upon a revisionist rising power that perceives the global status quo as unjust and restrictive (Kugler & Lemke, 1996).

A dynamic where both the conditions are fulfilled was popularly termed as 'Thucydides Trap' by Graham Allison (2017), based on his analysis of sixteen cases of power transition in the world history with twelve resulting in wars. Based on Allison's argument, China's rise puts the current global structure under stress and increased likelihood of conflict even if the leaders in Washington or Beijing do not deliberately pursue that path.

C. Critiques and Refinements

However, the standard Power Transition Theory has come under a fair amount of criticism, especially for its overreliance on material capabilities like GDP and production to measure parity, and ignoring Structural Power. Susan Strange (1988) conceptualizes Structural Power as the underlying forces that shape the global system across four key structures- Security, Production, Finance, and Knowledge.

Buckley (2018) highlights the misleading nature of Gross GDP as a measuring metric for power because it doesn't include the costs of power. Although China has high GDP, its 'net power' in terms of resource availability for global projection is lower, primarily because of massive costs of internal security and demographic burden. Ability to shape the global structure, not just the ability to produce, is critical for legitimate hegemony (Buckley, 2018).

'Stalled Rise' hypothesis has gained much attention lately. Analyses by Brands (2024) and Pettis (2024) revolve around the idea of Chinese growth reaching its peak instead of experiencing indefinite growth. The post-peak economic slowdown on China, further stressed by the property crisis since 2023, limits the ability of China to overtake the USA on the economic front and forces it to adopt a more aggressive military stance to maintain domestic legitimacy. This situation offers a narrowing window of opportunity where a peaking power goes for strike before its strength starts fading, creating a dangerous possibility in global geo-politics.

III. Theoretical Framework

This paper complements abstract theory with empirical analysis as it looks into power and dominance through three distinct variables that are measured based on recent data available in the public domain.

Variable I: Economic Capacity

- *Metric:* Gross Domestic Product (Nominal vs. PPP), Currency Dominance and Technological Autonomy.
- *Theoretical Relevance:* Organski uses Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) that is heavily reliant on industrial output. However, this paper investigates the extent of China's output translating into usable power and the technological constraints due to dependency on the west.

Variable II: Political Capacity (Domestic and Global)

- *Metric:* Military Power and Alliance Density.
- *Theoretical Relevance:* A hegemon is expected to provide security and currency at the global level. If China fails to create a global dominance through military power and alliances, it cannot be seen as replacement of US led world order.

Variable III: The Dissatisfaction Variable

- *Metric:* Voting alignment in the UN and the creation of parallel institutions like Global Security Initiative and BRICS +.

- *Theoretical Relevance:* This paper needs to evaluate China's degree of revisionism in terms of Status Quo reformist or Revolutionary Revisionism. Through data-based analysis of these three variables, this paper seeks to demonstrate that China's Resource Parity is heavily undermined by a Structural Disparity.

IV. Analysis:

The Economic Capacity

Economic scale has often been used to push the narrative of rising China and the potential power transition. China's growth story since the economic reforms and market liberalization in 1978, globally unprecedented in terms of extended period of double digit growth, has lent credibility to this narrative. However, a closer analysis reveals that China's growth has been slowing down, experiencing a plateauing effect that limits its potential as a hegemonic power. The manufacturing heft is still constrained by technological autonomy and financial dominance.

A. GDP(PPP) versus Nominal GDP

A reliable evaluation of claims towards China's economic parity requires a clear distinction between Purchasing Power Parity and Nominal GDP. Based on IMF report published in October 2025, purchasing power parity based evaluation of Chinese GDP places it around 35 trillion USD, which is 7 trillion dollar more than 28 trillion USD GDP(PPP) of the USA (IMF, 2025). Purchasing power parity is a useful metric to measure domestic purchasing power, whether it is about common consumers or the military. A superior GDP(PPP) indicates better living standards and also higher capability of internal procurement of military assets because of lower salary paid to the soldiers and lower prices of domestically produced weapons and equipment.

However, when it comes to measuring the global power, Nominal GDP provides a better picture because it reflects capability in terms of affording resources, technology and political influence on the international market. Looking into the economic data of 2025, USA has a significantly higher nominal GDP (30.5 trillion USD) as compared to the Chinese nominal GDP (19.4 trillion USD) with a clear gap of around 11 trillion USD (Statistics Times, 2025). Moreover, the Chinese growth trajectory has also changed in the recent years. Burdened by the crisis in the property sector, increasing debt burden of the local governments and demographic contraction slowed economic growth in 2025 to approximately 4.8% (World Bank, 2025).

As the future growth is expected to plateau around this level, in contrast to almost double digit growth trend in the earlier decades, China seems to be in 'Middle Income Trap' where it cannot achieve the level of per capita wealth that is needed to sustain global dominance. Based on these data, it can be argued that China does not fit in the role of rising power as theorized by Organski, but rather appears to be peaking power, which still poses serious concerns not because of China's great potential to threaten the USA but its narrowing window of opportunity to do so.

B. Currency Dominance:

Currency dominance is an important indicator of any country's hegemonic power. It gives a highly privileged option of printing currency to finance global trade, allowing it to navigate fiscal deficits without immediate crisis while also using it as a sanction tool against the adversaries.

Although Beijing has been trying to raise international profile of Renminbi by establishing bilateral trade deals in its own currency and opening currency swap lines among the BRICS nations, the USD still enjoys virtual control over the operations of global commerce. According to the IMF's Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) data for Q3 2025, the global allocated reserves is clearly dominated by the USD with overall share of 58.9%, with Euro being a distant second with 19.8% and Renminbi being an even distant third with 2.8% (IMF, 2025).

This disparity becomes even more critical when we understand its structural nature. If China seeks to displace the USD, it will require a complete opening of its capital account, which will allow free flow of money to and from China. In this case, the Chinese state will have no control over capital flight, thus weakening its control over the overall economy. As the Chinese Communist Party places political stability and control as its first and foremost priority, and economic control is a key component of it, financial liberalization is highly unlikely. It creates a hegemonic paradox as China seeks to establish Renminbi as a global currency and attain the associated geopolitical power, but it also avoids the financial reforms needed to facilitate that (Subramanian, 2023). With over 80% of the global trade finance happening in the USD, the USA maintains its capability to weaponize its currency dominance to contain its adversaries without fearing any immediate displacement.

C. The Technological Autonomy

In the realm of production and technology, the parameter of power transition has shifted from steel industry to silicon based dual use technology. Since the initiation of 'chip war' by the USA through introduction of export controls in October 2022, further tightened in 2024, China's vulnerability in manufacturing high end semiconductor has been exposed.

Although China has identified this vulnerability and taken measures to address it by making huge investments in achieving self-sufficiency in this area, it still remains reliant on western supply chains when it comes to most advanced lithography equipment like Dutch ASML machines or design software like US EDA tools. While China managed to make breakthrough in the production of 7nm and 5nm chips in 2025, the supply chain of 2nm and 3nm chips still remains under control of the USA and its allies like Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and Netherlands, and these technologies are crucial for the AI revolution that would define the future technological landscape (Miller, 2024).

Through its networked control over advanced technology the USA has created a 'structural choke point'. This is a virtual cartel of democratic allies that control the flow of advanced chip manufacturing technology, allowing USA to control and contain Chinese progress in the most crucial technology of the current century. It also shows the networked nature of the USA power that acts as a force multiplier that cannot be overcome by China just through increased domestic spending.

Political Capacity

As the Political Capacity indicates a government's ability to mobilize and extract resources to achieve national goals, Military Power is a key component of this capability. As this study moves beyond traditional Organski's Triad, the Political Capacity is evaluated in both domestic and global context. While the economic comparison of China with the USA reveals an illusion of parity, comparison of military aspect also shows asymmetry, but it's calculated in nature. If the standard interpretation of **Power Transition Theory** is applied, it would appear that China is attempting to capture global hegemony by matching US military capabilities in terms of naval ships and fighter jets. However, a closer scrutiny of strategic data from 2025 reveals that the military pursuits of China are not aimed at world dominance but to nullify USA power in the East Asia. Thus, the US military is essentially built for **Global Dominance** while the Chinese military strategy is focussed on **Regional Denial**.

A. The Navy

General discussion about the naval power centres around the number of hulls, with the higher number of hulls indicating the superiority in naval power. Based on the data available in early 2025, the People's Liberation Army Navy is the largest navy in the world if hull count is taken as a metric. As per the data provided by Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the Chinese Navy has approximately 400 battle ships in active duty as compared to the 295 ships present in the US naval fleet (ONI, 2025). In the context of power transition theory, a surface glance upon this data would lead to this conclusion that power transition is already complete.

However, relying on mere counting of hulls is a false indicator of power. When it comes to naval power, it moves beyond mere hull numbers to include other key metrics like tonnage and the capacity for Vertical Launch System (VLS). Based on the singular metric of hull count, a Type-056 corvette and a Ford-class supercarrier have the same value, but there is huge difference in the strategic capabilities both offer.

If we go with the metric of tonnage, the displacement by the US Navy is approximately 4.5 million tons as compared to 2.4 million tons displacement by the Chinese Navy (IISS, 2025). This makes the USA Navy almost twice the size of the Chinese Navy with its superior blue-water platforms giving the capability to run and sustain operations at much longer distances and durations.

When we investigate the naval power in terms of Carrier Capabilities, the induction of Fujian-003 in November 2025 marks an important milestone for the Chinese navy, as it is its third and most powerful aircraft carrier. Its electromagnetic catapults (EMALS) make it the first non-US carrier with such capabilities for launching heavier payloads (Naval News, 2025). However, all the Chinese carrier ships are conventionally powered, thus limiting their operational range. While the US Navy has a virtually unlimited range with its nuclear powered eleven carriers, from the Persian Gulf to the North Atlantic, the Chinese carrier ships have a limited range of the 'First Island Chain' and the Indian Ocean due to logistical constraints.

B. Global Dominance vs Regional Denial

While China's military power may not be enough for global dominance, it does have Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities. Its capabilities to challenge the USA dominance, thus indicating a limited power transition, is most tangible within the range of 'First Island Chain' that stretches from Japan to Taiwan and to the Philippines. In this region Chinese challenge is not by competing with US tonnage but by making any US intervention prohibitively costly. Through deployment of thousands of ballistic missiles capable of striking targets across the First Island Chain with an estimated 900 Short Range Ballistic Missiles and 1300 Medium range Ballistic Missiles (including DF-21D and D-26 'Guam Killer' and advanced hypersonic missiles like DF-17), PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has enough deterrence power to transform this region into a 'sanctuary' zone where China can project its power without exposing its expensive fleet to any credible threat (DOD, 2025). This scenario fits within the Revisionist framework of Organski's theory as China seems to be creating a paradigm shift in the Asian security architecture by practically nullifying US supremacy in the Yellow Sea and the South China Sea. Thus, while the USA maintains its global dominance, China seems to be succeeding with its Anti Access/Area Denial capabilities to force a power transition within this region

C. The Nuclear Challenge

There has been a remarkable shift in China's nuclear strategy in the recent years as its nuclear arsenal is rapidly expanding. For a long time, China's nuclear policy centred around 'lean and effective' deterrence. However, there has been a noticeable change in the strategy, indicated by the number of operational nuclear warheads reaching 600 in 2025, with a likelihood of reaching 1000 by 2023 (SIPRI,2025).

This rapid expansion of nuclear stockpile is accompanied by complementary launching ability. The Gansu and Xinjiang deserts have witnessed installation of 350 new silos capable of launching InterContinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). Combined with expanding nuclear warheads, these installations have changed the calculus of any regional conflict with Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). This change creates a 'Stability-Instability Paradox', where the likelihood of nuclear war is diminished due to the risk of mutual destruction, but conventional provocations like aggressions against Taiwan become less risky for China as the perceived risk of USA intervention in a limited Asian conflict diminishes with US territories like New York or Los Angeles also facing a similar risk of destruction(Kristensen & Korda, 2025).

D. The Alliance based Strength

In the comparison of military supremacy, Alliance network remains one of the most vital elements. The USA has extensive military alliances covering more than 50 countries, maintained through formal defence treaties that function as 'Hub- and-Spoke' model. These alliances were further revitalized in 2024. Strategic moves like inclusion of tactical cooperation with Japan to expand AUKUS or expanding the nuclear planning groups to include South Korea show that the USA has resilient structural advantage as compared to China (CSIS, 2025).

On the other hand, China is severely lacking when it comes to Alliance network. Except for North Korea, it doesn't have any formal military treaty with any country. Although it has a 'no limits' partnership with Russia, which showed signs of further deepening during the joint naval exercises in the Sea of Japan in 2025, it is rather transactional in nature. While Russia can favour China by supplying energy and missile technology, it also makes financial gains through these deals. It is a very unlikely partner of China when it comes to fighting on China's behalf. Thus, in the case of a global military conflict the USA has the advantage of having a coalition force at its disposal while China remains largely alone.

The Dissatisfaction Variable

Based on the Power Transition Theory, a conflict between the Hegemon and the Rising Power is likely when the Rising Power finds the status quo dissatisfactory. There is a possibility of joining the existing status quo (US led world-order) like Japan and Germany in the late 20th century and if China also chose to go the same way, the risk of a hegemonic war would not exist. However, there is growing evidence of China's dissatisfaction growing from a mere passive complaint raiser to an active builder of an alternative system. Instead of trying for closer integration within the Western Order, China is trying to build a parallel institutional system that would shield it against the US influence while also attracting the 'Global South'.

A. From Participant to Revisionist

Until 2020 China pursued the strategy of participating in the existing institutional structure, whether it be membership of WTO in 2001 or increased contributions towards UN peacekeeping missions. However, with power consolidation of Xi Jinping in his third and fourth term this era of China's 'peaceful rise' ended effectively.

The launch of 'Global Governance Initiative' (GGI) by Xi Jinping in September 2025 at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) marks a new era of Chinese ambitions. This initiative showed a strategic evolution from earlier Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Development Initiative (GDI) to present an ideological alternative to the US led 'rules-based international order' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs PRC, 2025).

The concept paper of GGI directly rejects the Western human rights based 'Universal Values' in favour of 'absolute sovereignty'. The US led western coalitions pursued the policy of humanitarian interventions in the post-cold war era. China provides a critique of this value set and offers a complete alternative to the developing countries by combining its GGI with Belt and Road Initiative. It offers infrastructural loans, Chinese technologies and a political framework where regime security takes precedence over democratic norms (Fiala, 2025). This strategic shift has placed China as firm Revisionist Power that is not looking for a powerful role within the existing system led by G7, but to create a new system altogether.

B. The BRICS+ Strategy

Although the contest between the US and China is often framed within competing loyalties of Europe and East Asia, the recent trend shows the Global South as the real friction point. Since its formation, BRICS has undergone most rapid expansion in the recent years through inclusion of Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and the UAE in 2024, and Saudi Arabia in 2025. This expanded BRICS or BRICS + represents a platform that represents around 46% of the global population but doesn't include any western G7 power.

Although internal rivalries within the group, like the one between China and India, undermine its credibility, especially from the western perspective. However, it has an important strategic function in terms of offering a tangible multi-polar world order. To challenge the financial hegemony of the US, BRICS nations started the pilot phase of 'BRICS Pay' system to facilitate trade settlements in local currencies, thus bypassing the SWIFT network altogether (China Daily, 2025). Although, as earlier pointed out, this system has not made any considerable impact on the global dominance of US dollar, it represents the intent of decoupling from US financial oversight and creating a economic shield for countries that fear sanctions from the US Treasury.

C. Use of Sharp Power

Another manifestation of dissatisfaction is 'Sharp Power' where the rival power is destabilized from within through the use of Information Warfare. Based on the reports by the US Office of Director of National Intelligence, there has been rapid rise in the state-affiliated bot networks operating against the USA in 2025. These bot networks amplify the divisions in domestic political views regarding trade, immigration, and social issues (The Diplomat, 2025).

This trend fits within the theoretical prediction that when a dissatisfied challenger thinks itself incapable of winning a direct military conflict, it seeks to weaken the 'political resolve' (the third pillar of Organski's power triad) of the hegemon. The agenda driven amplification of domestic political divisions is used to erode trust in democratic institutions of the USA, which can reduce its capability to mobilize resources against China in situations like Chinese aggression against Taiwan.

V. CONCLUSION

This research paper set out to establish the degree of challenge China's growing influence poses to American global supremacy. Using empirical data from the period of 2024-25 and applying Power Transition Theory, this paper finds a highly nuanced 'High Intensity, Low Structure' as the answer. The rivalry between the US and China appears to be in a stalemate that cannot be framed within the binary of 'rise vs. decline'. The best of describing this situation is Asymmetrical Entrenchment.

Analysis of economic capabilities shows resource parity when we look at purchasing power and manufacturing power. However, China is far behind when it comes to structural centrality. The US dollar still dominates the global currency reserves and commercial activities, and the US still exercises stranglehold on the supply chain of critical technologies like high-end semiconductors. With its structural centrality multiplied through network of alliances, the US is significantly ahead of China.

On the military front China has made massive progress with its naval power, fighter jets and nuclear stockpile. It presents credible threat to US operations around the First Island Chain. Moreover, its capability for inflicting 'mutually assured destruction' also minimizes chances of US intervention in China initiated contracted conflicts in Asia. However, China can only aspire to be a regional hegemon with its current military power. Only US has the needed logistics capability, blue-water tonnage and alliance network to sustain its status as a global hegemon.

Analysis of the third variable in Organski's Triad reveals that the danger is not as much due to China's power as its dissatisfaction level. Through its GGI initiative China has shown its rejection of western world view-based world order and a secondary place within it. Combining this revisionist ambition with the 'Peaking Power' anxieties increases possibility of volatility in the coming years.

Thus, the US remains at the helm of global order because its structural superiority nullifies the material parity achieved by China. However, this dominance is facing increasing challenges in the Indo-Pacific region where US military dominance is no longer guaranteed. It brings us to a situation where singular global dominance is increasingly replaced by a bifurcated order where China would try to create and lead a structural system for the authoritarian regimes as opposed to the US led advanced democracies.

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